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ABSTRACT
While the trust paradigm is essential to broadly extend the
communication between the environment’s actors, the eval-
uation of trust becomes a challenge when confronted with
initializing the trust relationship and validating the transi-
tive propriety of trust. Whether between users or between
organizations, existing solutions work to create for peer to
peer networks, flexible and decentralized security mecha-
nisms with trust approach. However, we have noticed that
the trust management systems do not make the most of the
subjectivity, more specifically, the notion of Disposition
to Trust although this aspect of subjectivity has a strong
influence on how to assess direct and a transitive trust. For
this reason in our study, we tackle this problem by intro-
ducing a new distributed trust model called T2D (Trust
to Distrust) which is designed to incorporate the follow-
ing contributions : (i) A behavior model which represents
the Disposition to Trust ; (ii) Initialization of trust relation-
ship (direct and transitive) according to the defined behavior
model.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C2.0 [Computer Communication Networks]: General—
Security and protection; K.4.4 [Computers and Society]:
Electronic Commerce—Security
General Terms
Security, Trust, Theory
Keywords
P2P network, Disposition to trust, Subjectivity, Trust Prop-
agation, Trust Transitivity
1. INTRODUCTION
In the domain of social sciences, there has been substantial
research regarding the concept of trust. The findings have
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been applied in areas including economics, finance, manage-
ment, government, and psychology. In recent years, trust
has acquired considerable interest in the computer science
community as the basis of security solutions to extend com-
munication in peer to peer topology.
The majority of trust management systems overlook the
initialization of trust relationship processes, they consider
that is not a problem of the model or else in the best of
circumstances they start all trust relations from zero. But
effectively the evaluation of the trustworthiness is not a
straightforward task. For instance on a range of 0 to 9,
with 0 representing blind trust, should a trustworthy node
be rated as 1, 2 or 3? The task is further complicated when
the number of nodes to be evaluated is large.
Moreover, in peer to peer networks, existing approaches
compute similarly trust evaluation processes for computing
a direct or transitive trust relation. We believe that this
evaluation should be adjusted according to the personality
of each actor (trustful or distrustful). In fact, a trustful
personality will give more confidence for a trust relation than
a distrustful one.
Thus, we should develop methods that work under the
assumption that the Disposition to trust (personality) has a
strong influence for both initialization and propagation trust
relationships. In this case, the main difficulties are to define
a generic model which is able to represent a disposition to
trust from a trustful to distrustful behavior. Then, use this
model to initialize direct trust and evaluate transitive trust
relation.
In our work, we aim to provide a customizable trust man-
agement system which makes the most of the Disposition
to trust property. Thus, the paper is organized as follows:
after exploring the related work (in next section) concerning
the disposition and the evaluation of trust, in section 3 we
introduce the basics of our T2D model and show how the
Disposition to Trust behavior in defined to customize the
evaluation of direct trust (in section 4) and transitive trust
(in section 5). Finally before concluding and introducing
future works, in section 6 we define a new simulator for gen-
erating a trust peer to peer networks in order to perform
some experiments.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Disposition to trust
In trust management models the subjectivity, more specif-
ically the disposition to trust is perceived at different de-
grees. This is particularly an issue in trust management
models that employ a numerical range for the quantification
of trustworthiness. For instance, on a range of 0 to 9, with 0
representing blind trust and 9 representing a blind distrust,
should a trustworthy node be rated as 1, 2 or 3? This eval-
uation mainly depends on the disposition to trust of each
node (personality). The disposition to trust is the inherent
propensity of an individual to trust or distrust others. An
individual’s disposition to trust does not vary for specific en-
tities but is a stable characteristic of their personality that
governs how they view the trustworthiness of every other
entity that they encounter. McKnight et al [11] define dis-
position to trust as the ”extent to which a person displays a
tendency to be willing to depend on others across a broad
spectrum of situations and persons”. Rotter [12, 13] notes
that an individual’s ”generalized attitude” towards trust is
a product of life experiences, such as interactions with par-
ents, peers, and authorities. Boone and Holmes [2] suggest
that good experiences lead to a greater disposition to trust
and vice versa. A study in the context of ecommerce by Mc-
Cord and Ratnasingam [10] has demonstrated that there is
a strong relationship between an individual’s disposition to
trust and the trust related decisions that they make. A thor-
ough examination of the literature on disposition to trust is
provided by Kaluscha [6]. We will now revisit a previous ex-
ample which evaluate trustworthiness in the range of [0,9].
Alice and Bob are two individuals with different dispositions
to trust. Alice has a high disposition to trust (trustful per-
sonality) and thus assigns a high trust value of 1 to Carol.
By contrast, Bob who has a lower disposition to trust (dis-
trustful personality), rates Carol’s trustworthiness as only
5. This subjectivity shows the difference between the eval-
uation of Bob and Alice regardless of the fact that Carol
exhibits the same behavior in her interactions with Alice
and Bob.
2.2 The trust evaluation :
How does one represent the amount of trust that one in-
dividual associates with another? A common approach is
to evaluate the direct trust relation with known entities by
the spectrum of trust quantitatively as a numerical range.
Marsh’s formalism [9] represents trust as a continuous vari-
able over an interval of [- 1,1]. Golbeck’s FilmTrust [5] de-
fines an integer range of 1 to 10. Gambetta [4], Griffiths
[7], and Toivonen [17] utilize an interval of [0.1] for this
purpose. An alternative approach is to divide the span of
trust into strata and assign them qualitative labels. The
stratification used by Abdul-Rahman and Hailes [1] is given
as the set Very Trustworthy, Trustworthy, Untrustworthy,
Very Untrustworthy). Josang [8], and Theodorakopoulos
[16] consider the subjectivity as the uncertainty propriety
and represent the trust evaluation by more then one value
in multidimensional model.
The trust propagation is as the result of the transitive
property of the relation trust. It plays an important role in
networks with peer to peer or adhoc topology. It allows any
entity to extend its confidence from its local knowledge by
building a trust path from trusted peer to trusted peer. In
the field of computers, the majority of the trust model ap-
proaches compute a trust average value or rescale their trust
evaluation between [0, 1] (if it’s not the case) then they ag-
gregate all of direct evaluation by multiplication operator.
For instance, if Alice trusts Bob as 0.5 and Bob trusts Carla
as 0.4, then Alice trusts bob as 0.2 = 0.5 ∗ 0.4. This ap-
proach is most used due to its flexibility; however it does
take into account the subjectivity for evaluating the trust
transitivity. In fact, a distrustful entity should evaluate a
trust path more aggressively than a trustful entity.
The models that have been previously shown mainly present
the following limits:
On one hand, it is so easy to assign semantic labels (eg
Very Trustworthy, Trustworthy, Untrustworthy) ([1], [18])
as it is more complex to give a numerical evaluation. Thus,
most solutions that address the trust evaluation make one
of the following assumptions:
(i) The trust initialization is not a problem of the model,
it is the responsibility of the actor of the system. However,
this task is not necessarily obvious, especially when it comes
to evaluating numerically a trusted third party (eg 0.1, 0.2,
or 0.15).
(ii) All trust relations are initially evaluated with the value
zero [8, 16]. This solution is, in some cases, interesting but
does not reflect reality, because a user has given an iden-
tity, status, ownership etc.. ; These are the attributes that
should be the starting point of any trust model.
On the other hands, the presented solutions consider the
subjectivity as the uncertainty propriety, despite the fact
(as seen before) that the disposition to trust is an important
parameter which must be considered for any trust evaluation
process (direct or transitive).
3. OUR APPROACH: T2D MODEL
Trust is an important element to build relationships and
establish collaborations and exchanges between different en-
tities in the environment. In peer to peer network, the trust
model allows to build and expand by the transitivity, from a
local of knowledge (direct trust), the circle of trust for every
peer.
We define a new decentralized trust management system
called T2D (Trust to Distrust) which evaluate trust relation-
ship on a scale start from max trust threshold (0) to max
distrust threshold (max > 0). Each actor is free to define
his max value and then evaluate his trust relationship ac-
cording to the defined scale.
For our trust model we represent a peer to peer network
as a Trust graph noted as Tg(N,E), a valued and directed
graph such that:
• N represents the set of the peer to peer network’s
nodes.
• Each Trust relation between two nodes is represented
by a directed edge e. The set of edges is consequently
identified with the set of relations, E.
• Each edge is valued by the trust degree between the
nodes represented by the source and destination nodes
of this edge.
In the previous section, we noted that the evaluation mod-
els of trust display some discrepancies, especially regarding
the disposition to trust. Indeed, the personality (trustful or
distrustful) of network’s peer has a strong influence on the
evaluation of the direct or transitive trust evaluation. Thus,
the evaluation of trust relation (direct and transitive), in
T2D model, is performed according to a mathematical func-
tion that allows to describe the personality of each node
from trustful to distrustful.
In the following sections, we illustrate how the T2D model
enable each node to define its own trust policy for evaluating
direct trust and transitive trust.
4. DIRECT TRUST
The direct trust relationship is represented in the trust
graph by an edge e. We noted this relation by Trust as
follow:
Definition 1. -Trust Relation- Let A and B two nodes
(A ∈ N , B ∈ N). If A trusts B then we say that an edge e
start form A to B and we note A Trust B. Thus A consider
B as trusted node.
Definition 2. -Trust Set TS- Each node builds its trust
set TS which is composed of the nodes that it can evaluate
directly for their trustworthiness (trusted node). In other
words the members of the set are those nodes with whom
the local node has a direct trust relationship.
Definition 3. -Trust function t0- Each trusted node is eval-
uated by a trust function noted t0 which gives to each edge
e a trust degree d in a range of [0, T 0]. So t0 evaluate from
Trust (0 represents the maximum trust) to Distrust (T 0
is the maximum distrust), hence the name of our model
T2D. t0 is defined as follows:
t0 : N ∗N → R+
(A,B) → d
t0(A,B) = d | 0 ≤ d ≤ T 0A
(1)
Definition 4. -The Distrust Threshold T 0- This value is a
positive number, it can be fixed freely by each node and it
represents the maximum tolerated distrust value of a node.
We believe that initialization of the trustworthiness of a
node as a numerical value is not a straightforward task. For
instance, on a trust scale of 0 to 9, should a “very trustwor-
thy node”be assigned the value 0, 1, 2 ... or 3? This example
illustrates the dilemma faced by any node when performing
this task. This difficulty occurs due to the difference between
the dispositions to trust of each node. To solve this problem
we introduce a novel method for the evaluation of trustwor-
thiness of nodes in the trust set. This method comprises of
the following two steps:
1. Compute a neutral evaluation using a Trust Sort pro-
cess.
2. Generate the quantitative evaluations according to the
disposition to trust.
4.1 TrustSort
The objective of this TrustSort is to define a method that
enables one to initialize the trust set TS of each node intu-
itively. Thus, instead of assigning trust values to individual
trusted nodes, we propose that each node performs trust
evaluations in relation to other nodes.
However, if a node is required to evaluate the trustworthi-
ness of other nodes in relation to other nodes we may have
the following scenario. Let’s say that Alice rates Cathy as
more trustworthy than David. Based on similar experiences
with Cathy and David, Bob is also very likely to rate Cathy
more trustworthy than David. We thereby make the as-
sumption that this alternate approach we are more likely is
more likely to have consistent trustworthiness evaluations.
We call the notion of evaluating nodes in relation to other
nodes as ”Trust Sort”. An administrator is in effect sorting
the foreign nodes in terms of their trustworthiness. The
product is a sorted list of nodes.
We note TrustSortn the node n’s sorted list. Each trust
set’s member has an entry in the sorted list. The value con-
tained in each box corresponds to their ranking in the list.
For instance TrustSortn(A) = 1 and TrustSortn(B) = 2
mean that n trusts A more than B and consider A as first
trusted node and B as the second one.
The sorting unit is fairly intuitive but can be limited when
it is used to sort more specifically a large number of elements.
To overcome these limitations, we can define a variant
of the last sorting process. In fact instead of applying the
Trust Sort process between all TS’s members, we can (i)
define a sorted groups, for example: (Max Trust ) (+)Good,
Average, Poor(-) (Max Distrust); (ii) assign each trusted node
to the corresponding group ; (iii) sort each group using the
TrustSort process.
4.2 Disposition to trust
4.2.1 Node behavior
The next sep of our proposal consists of representing the
node behavior. We can broadly classify nodes into two cate-
gories based on their disposition to trust. The first category
represents nodes that generally exhibit high levels of trust
in the members of their trust set. In contrast, the second
category represents the nodes that are inclined towards low
levels of trust in the members of their trust set.
We define a mathematical function BV (x) which is called
the (BehaVior) function. This function represents a curve
in the Cartesian coordinate system.
The input x is a positive value that represents the order
number of a node in the sorted list. The list is numbered
from 1 to n where n is the total number of nodes in the list.
The node in position 1 is the most trusted node.
The output BV (x) represents the corresponding quan-
titative trust value for the node based on the disposition to
trust of the local node.
We now present the contrast between nodes that exhibit
trustful and distrustful disposition to trust or behavior in
terms of the BV function.
Class1 -nodes that exhibit Trustful Behavior- :
This class represents the behavior of nodes which are more
trusting. We define that this characteristic is represented by
the BV function when it takes a hyperbola form. As illus-
trated in the figure 1 (box A) the projections of the x values
are gathered closer to the maximum trust value (zero).
Class2 -nodes that exhibit Distrustful Behavior- :
This class represents the behavior of nodes which are less
trusting. We define that this characteristic is represented
by the BV function when it takes a parabola form. As illus-
trated in the figure 1 (box B) the projections of the x values
are gathered closer to the minimum trust value.
Figure 1: The Trust Behavior
4.2.2 The behavior function
We use a Bezier curve to implement the BV function due
to the flexibility it enables plotting geometric curves.
Definition 5. The Bezier Curve is a parametric form to
draw a smooth curve. It is achieved through some points
P0, P1...Pn, starting at P0 going towards P1...Pn−1 and ter-
minating at Pn.
The BV function is expressed by a quadratic Bezier curve
that passes through three points where:
• The origin point (P0(0, 0)).
• The behavior point (P1(bx, by))
• The threshold point (P2(hx, hy)) where the hx repre-
sents the number of sorted node and the hy represents
the trust threshold.
As illustrated in the figure 2, by moving the behavior point
P1 inside the rectangle that is defined by P0 and P2, we are
able to adjust the curvature.
Based on the Bezier curve, let us now define the “BV
function”.
As defined previously, the BV function describes the trust
behavior of a node. It takes the order number of a node in
the sorted list as the abscissa x and returns the correspond-
ing “Quantitative trust value”BV (x).
To apply the BV function with the Bezier curve, we mod-
ify the Bezier curve to obtain the ordinate as a function of
abscissa, instead of taking a temporal variable ‘t’ as input
to compute both abscissa and ordinate.
The BV function curve is drawn through the three points
P0(0, 0), P1(bx, by) and P2(hx, hy) using the Bezier curve.
We assume that it is sufficient to move the point P1 through
the second diagonal of the defined rectangle bx =
−hy
hx
∗ by +
hy to plot a large panel of behaviors.
Definition 6. -The disposition to trust level l0- We de-
fine the variable l0 which bounded between 0 and 1 give
updated positions for P1 through the second diagonal. For
instance, the value l0 = 0 indicates maximum trustful be-
havior (P1(hx, 0)) and l
0 = 1 represents maximum distrust-
ful behavior (P1(0, hy)).
After computing the Cartesian function from the Bezier
parametric format and have fixed the position of the point
P1 according to the disposition to trust level l
0, we obtain
the following function:
BV : [0, hx] −→ [0, hy ]
X −→ Y
BV
l0,hx,hy
(X) =
{
(hy−2by)
4b2x
X2 +
by
bx
X si (hx − 2bx = 0)
(hy − 2by)(∝ (X))2 + 2by ∝ (X), si (hx − 2bx 6= 0)
Where


∝ (X) = −bx+
√
bx
2
−2bx∗X+hx∗X
hx−2bx
0 ≤ bx ≤ hx ∧ hx > 0
bx = (1 − l0) · hx ∧ by = hy · l0
(2)
Figure 2: The Behavior curve functions
4.3 Generating quantitative trust values
Given l0 and the threshold points (P2), the BV function
is able to assign each node in the sorted list a corresponding
quantitative trust value as follows:
1. Specifying the P1 is achieved by selecting the corre-
sponding disposition to trust l0 between 0 and 1.
2. The P2 point is specified by assigning hx and hy the
following values: hx=(Number of trusted nodes) + 1
and hy = T
0(the trust threshold).
3. Putting the trusted nodes as classified along the ab-
scissa of the BV function.
Thus the evaluation of the trust function t0 will be done
as follows:
t0 : N ∗N → R+
(A,B) → d
t0(A,B) = BVl0,hx,hy (TrustSortA[B]).
(3)
Example: Let’s consider two nodes where:
- n1: Trustful node, l
0 = 0.1;
- n2: Distrustful node, l
0 = 0.8.
These nodes evaluate five trusted nodes (A,B,C,D,E). The
threshold point P2 has the coordinates: hx = 5 + 1 =
6 and hy = T
0 = 50.
The sorted list of both n1 and n2 is:
(high trust)(+) D, C, E, A, B (-)(low trust)
As illustrated in the figure 3, by performing the BV func-
tion the values assigned to the trusted nodes would be as
follows:
node A node B node C node D node E
node n1 13.9 24.2 3.9 1.5 7.8
node n2 46.1 48.6 36.1 25.8 42.2
Table 1: Example of initializing trust set’s value.
Figure 3: Node classification
5. TRANSITIVE TRUST
With the relation Trust, the trust graph is connected like
a peer to peer network. This Trust relation can be transitive
iff:
∀A,B,C ∈ N,A Trust B ∧ B Trust C ⇒ A Trust C (4)
This property is fundamental for the effectiveness of the
proposition. It allows defining ”trust paths” between nodes
that do not know each other as follows:
let n0, n1, ..., nk ∈ N | ∀i = 0, ..., k − 1 (ni Trust ni+1).
We define a Trust path by : Ptk = (n0, n1, ..., nk) where:
• nk is called the target node. It represents the node
which be evaluated.
• n0 is called the source node. It represents the node
that wants to evaluate the target one.
The evaluation of each Trust Set is decentralized. Each
node evaluates its distrust threshold independently from other
ones. This can lead to a divergence in the evolution of
the transitive access. For example: one node can value its
trusted nodes up to 20 and another can value its owns up to
500. To smooth these differences and to perform a neutral
evaluation, we define the Trust propagation function P 0. P 0
uses the sum operator to add all the degree of trust path’s
edge relatively to the distrust threshold of the source node.
Definition 7. -Distrust propagation function P 0- Let A,
B, C 3 nodes (A is the source and C is the Target). The com-
position of the trust degrees t0(A,B) and t0(B,C), noted
P 0(A,B,C) = t0(A,B)⊕ t0(B,C) is defined as :
P 0(A,B,C) = t0(A,B) + t
0(B,C)
T0
B
∗ T 0A
Generalization: trust paths
The composition of distrust degrees is generalized to n
nodes through the trust path Ptn by composing two by two
the trust degrees t0:
P
0(Ptk) =


t0(n0, nk) si 0 ≤ k ≤ 1
P 0(Ptk−1) +
T0n0
T0nk−1
∗ t0(nk−1, nk) si k > 1
(5)
Definition 8. -Global distrust threshold- To validate or
invalidate a trust path we define the Global distrust thresh-
old θT 0. Each node n has to define its global distrust
threshold, corresponding to the maximum tolerated degree
for a transitive evaluation. This value is proportional to the
distrust threshold T 0 and to the defined maximum autho-
rized path length Ln, as follows:
θT 0 = T 0 ∗ (1 + (1− Lp) ∗ (1− l
0))
Consequently, if the evaluation of the trust path (P 0(Ptk))
is less than the distrust threshold, i.e. 0 ≤ P 0(Ptk) ≤ θT
0
n0
,
the source node n0 trusts the trust path Ptk and thus trust
the target node nk .
Example:
Let five nodes that build a trust path Pt4 = (n0, n1, n2, n3, n4).
To decide if the source n0 can trust the target n4, we com-
pute the P 0(Pt4) progressively (see figure 4).
If Ln0 = 3 ∧ T
0
n0
= 70 then θT 0n0 = 70 ∗ 3 = 210.
As a consequence, the source n0 considers the target n4
as trust node since:
0 ≤ (P 0(Pt4) = 152) ≤ (θT
0
n0
= 182)
Figure 4: The Trust Propagation
6. SIMULATIONS
For the evaluation of our proposal we have implemented in
Python a simulator (TrustSim). We have used this simulator
to compute the trust path Lp which further enables calcu-
lation of the maximum distrust threshold θT 0 = T 0 ∗ Lp.
To accomplish this task we assume that the interconnection
between nodes is higher if the network is composed of trust-
ful nodes. In fact, each node would trust almost of all other
nodes if the network is 100% trustful. The TrustSim can be
freely downloaded on this link [14].
Figure 5: Path simulation: This graph is performed
through network size=1000 nodes.
We run the simulation for a set of different networks char-
acterized by their size. The set of the simulation is composed
of networks sizes 200, 300, 500, 1000. Let’s represent the size
by the variable s and the maximum neighborhood degree of
a node as n0.
We run the simulation over networks’ size by varying n0
between 2 and 30 and Lp from 1 to 10. For each increment
we compute the percentage of network’s connections, i.e.
how many nodes is considered as trusted from any given
network node (see figure 5). We use the term“Trust average
(a)” for this result.
We take the result of the simulation (i.e. the Trust aver-
age) and we use it to draw an interpolation curve. This curve
is given as the function called the Trust Path TP function.
This function returns the corresponding recommended path
p according to network size s, trust neighborhood average
n0 and the access average a as follows:
TP : ]0, 1] ∗ [1, N ] −→ R+
(a, n0) −→ Lp
TP (a, n0) = α(S) ∗ a
n0
(a∗ln(n0+1))1,5
+ 1
Where α(s) = 0, 05 ∗ s+ 32, 5.
In table 2, we assume that for a = 75% the network is
very highly connected. As illustrated in table 2, by fixing a
to 75%, we compute the trust recommended path according
to several network characteristics, i.e. the network size and
the average neighborhood degree.
s\n0 5 10 15 20 25 30
200 7.5 2 1.5 1 1 1
400 9 2.3 1.3 1.1 1 1
600 10.5 2.5 1.3 1.1 1 1
800 12 2.7 1.4 1.1 1 1
1000 13.5 2.9 1.4 1.1 1 1
Table 2: Maximum recommended path.
7. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a new approach for computing trust in
peer to peer topology. A novel feature of this approach is
that each node can evaluate its trust set by simply fixing its
trust behavior than sorting the trusted nodes based on their
trustworthiness.
The TrustSort method can be applied on one or more
groups of trusted nodes. Each group would define a certain
level of distrust e.g. group 1 can be defined to be trustworthy
and group 2 can be defined in comparison to group 1 as
being less trustworthy. Thus, each node is able to evaluate
a large number of sites by classifying each one of them in
the appropriate group.
In relation to future work, we would like to improve the
TrustSort approach by a reputation mechanism. In this ap-
proach, the initial attributed value may change positively
or negatively according to the node behavior. In fact, each
node can inquire its trusted node one by one above all other
trusted nodes. Then according to the responses received
from the nodes, a classification for a node n can change if
the nodes that have initially the same perception of the node
n, change their evaluation.
Using this trust transitivity is particularly attractive for
the distributed environment where propagation is computed
using summation instead of average. Methods that use av-
erage do not take into account the length of the trust propa-
gation path. In fact, using averages, access can be acquired
over a path even if some sub-paths are not valid. However,
using summation, distrust would increase when the length
of the path increases. Consequently, if we cross the fixed
threshold, the trust propagation path would be invalidated
and access would not be allowed. Thus, it always holds true
for a valid path that it does not contain any invalid sub-
paths. In future work, we will also integrate the disposition
to transitivity for computing the trust path by increasing
the neutral evaluation according to the personality of the
node.
Our T2D trust model was successfully implemented for
trust requirements in pervasive [15] and grid scenarios for
the GeenNet project [3].
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